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SHAKEOUTS IN DIGITAL MARKETS 
 
 
By 
 
 
George S. Day and Adam J. Fein* 
 
 
 
Shakeouts loom large in the landscape of all fast-growing markets.  During the 
boom period an unsustainable glut of competitors is attracted by forecasts of high growth 
and promises of exceptional returns.  Even when the market is already crowded more 
entrants keep arriving.  These followers are often naïve about the barriers to entry and 
don’t realize how many others are also poised to enter at the same time. Reality intrudes 
with a bust that precipitates the exit of more than 80 percent of the players through failure 
or acquisition.  This shakeout is triggered by some combination of disappointing growth, 
pricing pressures that degrade profit prospects, or shortages of crucial people and 
financial resources.1 
Only the strongest and most resilient firms can survive a shakeout.  This is a 
pattern that was played out as long ago as the genesis of the railroad, telephone and 
automobile industries and as recently as software and personal computers.  Consider that 
fifteen years ago there were 832 PC makers; now there are arguably eight to ten viable 
survivors.  That history is now being repeated in virtually every Internet market. 
Collapsing equity prices and catchy headlines, such as “The Dot-coms are Falling 
to Earth,” “Is that E-Commerce Road kill I See,” and “The Last e-Store on the Block” 
confirm the onset of a bust.  As pure play start-ups and incumbents in markets being 
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transformed by the Internet try to navigate this turbulence, the first question is whether 
this “new economy” shakeout will be like those in the past or make new rules.  We 
believe that while the pace is unlike anything we have seen before, much can be learned 
from the past. 
The first lesson to be drawn from history is that pure play dot.coms will survive 
and prosper only in breakthrough markets. These on-line markets are the handful of 
applications that could only have been realized with the Internet. A corollary is that 
established firms will have the upper hand in markets that have been re-formed by the 
Internet. In these applications, network technologies help to squeeze out costs and 
facilitate interactions, but don’t change the basic structure and functioning of the market. 
In retrospect the vast majority of applications of the Internet were to re-form 
markets, so it follows that the prospects for most pure play start-ups were delusional in 
the past and bleak in the future. The vast majority will exit their markets; but in contrast 
with past shakeouts where most exits were by merger, we expect a much higher 
proportion will simply close their doors. 
A further lesson is that both the pure plays that survive and the incumbents that 
gain an advantage from this disruptive innovation will have all the attributes of adaptive 
survivors of precursor shakeouts.2 The companies that remain standing will be a resilient 
synthesis of old and new.  
What’s New in the New Economy? 
Shakeouts in the old economy took years to unfold.  In the relatively fast-paced 
market for hard-disk drives for PC’s ten years passed between the entry of the first firm 
in 1979 and the onset of the shakeout.  In the new economy hot house, thousands of 
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Internet players were spawned between 1998 and 2000.  Truly there was a glut of entrants 
when at least 150 on-line brokerages, 1000 travel-related sites, 40 on-line commercial 
printers, and 30 health and beauty sites were vying for attention and advantage. 
Few e-commerce arenas have been more contested than on-line Business-to-
Business (B2B) exchanges;3 280 were visible at the end of 1999, and a year later, a peak 
of 1500 was reached. Most entrants were pure-plays such as Metal Site, Chemdex, and 
Neoforma, attracted by the opportunity to help buyers and sellers efficiently connect with 
each other in large markets.  The possibilities that these hubs and exchanges might 
control trade across an industry soon energized the incumbents.  Some responded by 
launching their own sites to streamline the purchasing process.  Many also joined their 
rivals in consortia such as Enerva in chemicals and e2open in electronics.  This 
proliferation of ownership arrangements, with conflicting vertical and horizontal business 
models has set the stage for a shakeout that  was well underway4 by April 2000. 
[Insert Figure here] 
If so, the boom and bust cycle will span a mere five years, clocking a pace that is 
five to ten times as fast as in the old economy. The average length of the shakeout period 
was over ten years during the first half of the 20th century. Typical shakeouts began 20 to 
30 years after the first company entered the new market.5  
Some of the most vulnerable e-retailing arenas such as toys and pet foods are 
imploding even faster. The overshooting of the eventual carrying capacity of most e-
commerce markets and the rapid rush for the exit were aggravated by widespread 
delusions that the Internet would rewrite the old rules of competition and create 
breakthrough applications in every market.  In retrospect, there were only a handful of 
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these breakthroughs; the rest re-formed existing markets to squeeze out costs and 
facilitate interactions. 
UNDERSTANDING ON-LINE MARKETS 
 
Advances in technology have historically created two kinds of market 
opportunities; some are real breakthroughs that were not previously possible, but most 
are re-formulations of existing ideas.  Most new economy start-ups thought they had a 
once-in-a-lifetime breakthrough, when the reality was more modest. 
Breakthrough applications re-write the rules by creating new products or services 
that would not have been possible without the new technology – and which 
simultaneously enable an entirely new market to emerge.   
Consider the television industry.  Standards for black and white transmissions 
were only established in 1941, yet there were 90 manufacturers operating by 1951.6 
When this breakthrough application was identified, many firms entered the market with 
experimental versions of the product.  Uncertainty was very high because true customer 
demands were not yet known.  Each product variant represented some combination of the 
possible product attributes and performance characteristics.  At this early stage of market 
evolution, these different versions were essentially experiments and variations on what 
ultimately developed to be a television.  The shakeout ultimately reduced the number of 
competitors by 80% as product characteristics were defined, distribution channels 
established, and content was broadcast. 
In contrast, re-formed applications of a new technology do not change the basic 
structure, functioning and purpose of the market.  Instead, these markets form around 
technologies that enable cost reductions or improvements to existing ways of doing 
 5
business.  Success is based on innovative strategies for competing within an existing 
industry network rather than a complete redefinition of industry boundaries and norms.  
Technology has its biggest impact here by improving selected elements of an existing 
business model. 
The case of biotechnology provides an illuminating example for dot-com 
executives.  More than 800 biotechnology-based companies were founded between 1979 
and 1989.  Like the e-commerce companies of recent history, venture capitalists willingly 
funded small start-ups with limited revenues and enormous “burn rates” so long as 
suitable scientific talent was present.  A healthy IPO market ensured a steady stream of 
new companies.  Established chemical and pharmaceutical companies lacked the 
scientific know-how about the science of biotechnology and could not easily attract 
leading scientists away from the lure of start-up riches.  Many industry analysts believed 
that these small start-ups would one day replace the leading pharmaceutical companies. 
 With hindsight, it is now clear that breakthroughs in biotechnology did not 
correspond to breakthroughs in the health care and pharmaceuticals markets.  
Biotechnology is a classic re-formed market in that the technology enabled improvements 
to the drug discovery process rather than a wholesale redefinition of all aspects of the 
pharmaceutical “business model.” The start-ups lacked access to valuable complementary 
resources required for success, including sales and marketing know-how, knowledge of 
the regulatory process, established distribution channels, and experienced management.  
Only a handful of the start-ups have survived as independent companies.  The rest have 
partnered with larger incumbents, been acquired, or simply shut down. 
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The Case of the Construction Industry. The $200 billion construction industry is 
fraught with inefficiencies.  Architects, builders, engineers and general contractors spend 
sizable amounts of time handling and shipping drawings and other items related to a 
project.  Project design teams can be widely geographically dispersed.  Once a project 
design is completed, it rarely remains intact during the course of construction.  Problems 
arise with material supply, building codes, and misspecification.  Sometimes, architects 
and owners simply change their minds.  Changes to any part of a building tend to ripple 
through an entire design, requiring that all participants know of all changes. 
The prospect of a breakthrough improvement in workflow coordination has 
attracted at least 80 dot-coms to this market.  And indeed, the web has completely 
transformed all aspects of construction project management by quickly and efficiently 
coordinating the efforts of multiple firms in different locations. 
Contrast the workflow coordination activities with materials procurement, where 
the intense fragmentation of the contractor industry has been a major barrier to change.  
With few exceptions, contractors in the construction industry are small businesses with a 
regional focus.  Purchasing is more typically handled by the business owner or by project 
managers in the field rather than an actual purchasing department.   
Over 20,000 distributors currently provide materials to customers at a local level.  
Currently, a quick phone call from a cell phone will provide same-day, or next morning, 
delivery of necessary items directly to a job site.  The alternative of placing computers 
and cellular modems on the job site would not increase efficiency, would require 
significant training, and is not yet technologically feasible.  On-line resellers of 
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construction materials are quickly finding out that contractors see limited value in using 
the Internet for purchasing. 
The Digital Market Continuum 
 While the distinction between breakthrough and re-formed markets is a useful 
starting point, most markets shaped by the Internet have elements of both. Instead of 
dichotomy there is a continuum of markets with a few breakthroughs such as portals and 
auctions close to one end and most applications bunched at the re-formed end. 
 In the middle of this continuum we enter a long-running debate about what is a 
new product, and what are the boundaries that define an industry. The Internet raises the 
stakes in this debate by blurring traditional boundaries. Indeed, the concept of 
“marketspace” captures the ambiguity of markets where competitors are also 
collaborators, firms reorganize around customer-facing or supplier-facing applications of 
the Internet enabled by customer relationship management (CRM) or supply-chain 
management (SCM), and every product connected to the net can become a source of 
service revenues.7 
 The location of a firm on the continuum of on-line markets requires difficult 
judgments about the market being served. The debate is especially intense when the 
strategy is in flux. Pure plays like Amazon are widening their scope to encompass other 
activities besides those conducted over the Internet and developing additional capabilities 
and assets.8 Established firms are also deploying the Internet to augment their strategies 
and reinforce their competitive positions. The debate is better informed when the digital 
market is dissected according to the dimensions shown on the attached figure: 
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 Customer behavior. Many e-commerce start-ups believed that Internet-enabled 
services would have such superior benefits that customers would rapidly alter their 
behavior.  But another reality of re-formed markets is that customers are reluctant to 
disrupt systems that work, even if those systems are partially uneconomic or somewhat 
inefficient.  
This is particularly true when the stakes are high, such as business customers that 
must procure supplies to keep factories and offices running without disruption or 
downtime. The digital market looked promising because customers in most business-to-
business channels face enormous organizational costs for procurement, purchasing and 
inventory maintenance.  On-line systems that could reduce these costs and improve 
efficiencies held great promise. 
But B2B hubs appear to have misdiagnosed their relative advantage.  During the 
past ten years, industrial customers have been focusing on improving efficiencies in their 
supply chain by consolidating supply contracts and reducing the number of suppliers.  A 
supplier that can lower a customer's total cost of acquisition is preferred over one that 
simply offers a lower price.  
Many B2B auction sites go against these fundamental trends by emphasizing the 
lowest price instead of lowest total procurement cost.  One venture capitalist behind a 
failed industrial supplies start-up reluctantly conceded: “We thought buyers would want 
to surf the Web for industrial supplies, but they had other priorities.”  Translation: 
Business customers care more about getting the right product at the right time than about 
saving a few incremental percentage points on price by perusing an on-line site that lacks 
access to their preferred brands. 
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 The plight of Internet banks tells a similar story for household consumers.  So far, 
Internet banking has proved to be simply too inconvenient compared to existing methods.  
Consumers were asked to send checking deposits by mail, generating fears of missed 
deposits and lost checks.  There was no access to the fee-free ATM networks that most 
people rely on for withdrawals. Older consumers, who hold a disproportionate amount of 
deposited assets, have been reluctant to trust “branch-less” banking.  
Startups bet their futures – and the money of venture capitalists – on rapid 
customer acceptance of new ways to interact with their financial institutions.  But 
behavior is difficult to change, implying adoption rates that are much slower than many 
start-ups initially expected.  In this era of Internet speed, it is ironic that time may prove 
to be the greatest enemy of these companies. 
Leveragability of incumbent advantages. The litmus test of whether an on-line 
market is break-through or re-formed is the leverage of the resources and advantages of 
the established firms. In re-formed markets the incumbents have built-in advantages with 
their trusted brand names, customer relationships, systems that are readily convertible to 
the Internet, and financial depth. This is why Office Depot, which sells everything from 
paper clips to computers, has become the second largest on-line retailer in the world 
(behind Amazon.com). Their on-line success stems from the large catalog operation, 
which had the right kind of fulfillment systems and capabilities in place long before the 
Internet was a viable channel. 
All the reasons that established firms prevail in re-formed markets have little 
leverage in breakthrough markets. Indeed, their resources, strategies, structures, and 
mind-set put them at an initial disadvantage because they could not envision the 
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transformative possibilities. This gave Yahoo, eBay, and AOL time to get firmly 
established. 
The composite markets in the middle of the continuum are the home of on-line 
sites that can leverage some strengths on incumbent but usually benefit from a separate 
identity. Thus, reflect.com can leverage Procter & Gamble’s product innovations, deep 
market knowledge and financial resources to create different but not entirely novel value 
propositions. On this site, visitors can custom design their own cosmetics and create 
something that would otherwise have required a cosmetician.  
Ability to capture value from Internet technologies: In re-formed markets, 
incumbents control the capabilities or assets that are required to apply Internet 
technologies to existing relationships. For example, B2B exchanges promised increased 
efficiencies in procurement by restructuring existing processes. But generating 
sustainable value from any innovation requires deep knowledge of customers and their 
purchasing preferences. Most of the start-ups lacked this knowledge as well as long-
standing relationships with these customers. 
Furthermore, the start-ups found it difficult to protect any proprietary knowledge 
advantage without access to complementary assets.9 They found themselves operating in 
an environment characterized by extensive knowledge spillovers. In the Internet 
economy, the widespread use of external “e-consultants” ensured that knowledge 
diffused rapidly to any firm that was willing to pay. 
Start-ups tried to accelerate information spillover by hiring employees of 
incumbents—“clicks recruiting from bricks.” Many B2B hubs were really just 
intermediaries between buyers and sellers, whether as virtual wholesalers, exchanges or 
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suction sites. They often raided executives from wholesaler-distributors because these 
companies had domain expertise in a vertical value chain plus experience in the 
economics of an intermediary business. 
Constraints and Inhibitors.  Many market challengers have been disabled by 
unexpected barriers that incumbents had long learned to live with.  These constraints 
serve as isolating mechanisms that impede competitive moves.  Protected niches within a 
market—stemming from long-standing relationships or regulations designed to protect 
some players in a value chain—are among the signals of these killer constraints.  These 
signals were frequently downplayed by e-commerce challengers during the optimism of 
the boom period. 
?? The on-line auto infomediaries like Autobytel, Auto Web, and Cars.com, 
face restrictive state-level regulations that bar anyone from clinching the 
sale.  Some states go further to require a new car buyer to pick-up their car 
at a dealership.  Without the ability to make a sale the online buying 
services are left with only the revenues from lead generation for dealers.   
 
?? Most Internet postage sites such as eStamp, Neopost, and Stamps.com 
encountered heavy regulation by a US Postal Service concerned about 
fraudulent postage. This impediment plus unexpectedly high costs of $500 
or more to acquire each customer dimmed their prospects of survival. 
 
?? While the concept of Brandwise.com, a comparison-shopping website for 
appliances was appealing it was unable to overcome two killer constraints.  
Up to 80 percent of sales to consumers of appliances are immediate 
replacements of broken units, leaving no time or inclination for careful 
comparison-shopping.  Another impediment was the inability of 
geographically dispersed and incompatible retail systems to communicate 
inventory status or fulfill orders.  The existing system had long adapted to 
these rigidities and had little incentive to change. 
 
?? Pure play online pharmacies’ were hobbled by the relationship of 
pharmaceutical benefit managers (PBMs) and pharmacies with major 
employers and health plans.  These were never opened up.  Further 
constraints were the unwillingness of consumers to wait for their 
prescription to be delivered so they could begin treatment, and hesitations 
about credit card security and sharing of their personal information. 
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The nature of on-line interactions imposes further constraints. Many products are 
unsuitable because their quality or reliability cannot be readily described or 
communicated in digital terms.10 There are inherent delays in navigating sites, finding 
information and making choices that are exacerbated by the volume of information and 
plethora of options. The lack of human contact eliminates opportunities for clarification, 
problem solving, reassurance and negotiation. These limitations don’t negate the Internet, 
but often relegate it to a supportive and subordinate role in a market. 
First mover advantages. A key tenet of the new economy was that first movers 
would dominate.11 By gaining an early lead, a new economy was assumed to set off a 
virtuous cycle of increasing return was assumed in which this early lead created a 
“winner take all” market. Other pioneering advantages include first choice of market 
segments and the ability to preempt scarce resources, even minor ones such as Internet 
domain names. Indeed, the historical evidence suggests that the shakeout survivors in 
breakthrough industries have been the companies with the largest market shares before 
the shakeout began.12 
But the situation is reversed in a re-formed market because success depends on 
stealing away repeat purchase or replacement demand from current competitors. New 
economy start-ups sabotaged their chances of success of pursuing pioneer strategies 
designed for breakthrough markets. 
Consider the over 1500 business-to-business (B2B) hubs that have emerged to 
facilitate the meeting of buyers and sellers (matchmaking). B2B hubs have discovered 
that their greatest competition is not other B2B hubs, but rather the existing ways of 
doing business. A “first mover advantage” versus another hub is relatively meaningless 
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compared with hurdle of competing against an in-place system of buyers, distributors, 
brokers, and other suppliers. The biggest challenge is convincing customers to switch 
their behavior, not simply beating a rival exchange to market. 
Acceptance of non-traditional pricing structures.  The Internet has made 
radically new pricing schemes possible.  Many on-line companies adopted pricing 
structures that departed greatly from traditional industry practice.  The most famous 
example is the Priceline reverse auction model, which many people believed would 
become the dominant model for pricing. 
Despite the theoretical appeal, most consumers still perceive a system of prices 
posted by sellers to be more convenient and fair.  The belief that “everything is different” 
encouraged innovative trials – yet ignored the reality that re-formed markets have built-in 
expectations and well-established reference prices. 
A similar phenomenon is occurring with B2B exchanges. These marketplaces do 
not take on the logistic and physical distribution functions of the supply chain.  Instead, 
they attempted to insert themselves in the channel at the strategic point when customers 
decide who to buy from, how much to buy, and how much they will spend.  As payment 
for matching buyers and sellers through electronic networks, on-line exchanges are 
attempting to charge fees to sellers ranging from two to five percent of gross sales.   
Yet the vast majority of industrial suppliers are still independent distributors and 
dealers who continue to thrive due to their great skill at maintaining high levels of locally 
delivered customer service and support.  Even the largest Fortune 500 customers continue 
to patronize mostly private, family-owned distributors.  Although the fees the exchanges 
wanted to charge appeared low, they were more than 50% of a typical distributor’s net 
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margin.  Competition is quickly lowering these transaction fees to marginal cost – or 
lower.  Some exchanges are seeing transaction fees drop to as low as one-quarter of one 
percent, which is not enough to cover operating and capital expenses.  
 
STRATEGIES FOR WINNERS 
 
 Even after the field of PC makers had shrunk in half between 1985 and 1990, 
there was no way to know that Dell, Gateway, and Hewlett-Packard would be among the 
winners a decade later.  Apple Computer is the only company founded during the earliest 
stages of the PC boom that survives today.  Any forecast of the names of the eventual on-
line winners and losers is even more perilous and presumptuous.   
Nonetheless, our research—building on the lessons of the past—strongly suggests 
that the prospective winners will be found in two camps. They will either be pure play 
start-ups that capitalized on their early mover advantages in breakthrough markets, or 
incumbents that successfully embraced the Internet in re-formed markets.  Both types of 
winners will be like the adaptive survivors of earlier shakeouts. 
Pure-Play Winners  
 Yahoo and eBay are reasonable nominees for this category.  Both were quick to 
exploit the breakthrough possibilities of the Internet with business models that did not 
exist previously.  Thus there were no incumbents to challenge them.  Both have exhibited 
the ability to continuously adapt, while resisting the impulse to grow as quickly as 
possible and diffusing their energy, or participating in alliances that might restrict later 
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moves.  This takes vision and discipline.  The rewards were early profitability, large 
market capitalization and strong brand equity. 
 Why is Yahoo likely to prevail?  First, they realized very early that being a portal 
was more than providing a search engine.  By adding content and features such as news 
headlines, e-mail boxes, auctions, chat rooms, and on-line gaming, they became a full-
service infomediary. Second, they have consistently offered a clear customer value 
proposition as a “cool,” simple guide to the Internet, which they supported with heavy, 
brand-building expenditures.  With sticky services such as e-mail they have been able to 
keep their users from switching to other portals.  As rivals Lycos, Excite, and Infoseek 
kept shifting their focus and priorities, Yahoo was refining its position as the premier 
point-of-access to the web. 
 eBay shares many of Yahoo’s survivorship traits.  They have become the 
predominant person-to-person trading community with an auction format that could not 
have existed without the Internet.  They have built this position by keeping a single-
minded focus on customer auctions.  Their long-term marketing agreement with AOL 
helped give them a critical mass of buyers, sellers, and items listed for sale.  Buyers are 
attracted to eBay by lots of sellers and vice versa in a reinforcing cycle that overwhelmed 
competitive sites. 
 eBay and Yahoo are strikingly similar in ways that enhanced their ability to 
prevail in high turbulence. Their early profitability and successful IPOs eliminated 
financial constraints and gave them the nutrients for continuing growth.  The equity 
markets awarded both firms high valuations because they had many options to pursue to 
maintain growth, while not being overly encumbered by contractual obligations and 
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restrictive alliances.  Most importantly they were guided by clear, customer-centered 
visions and robust, differentiated business models that engendered strong customer 
loyalty.  
 While the prospects for survival for both Yahoo and eBay are promising, they are 
far from assured.  With sharply declining stock prices,13 both have become more 
attractive take-over candidates.  Yahoo is struggling to keep revenues from dropping 
sharply as traditional adventurers buy fewer banner ads because they are not as 
informative as print, as entertaining as TV, or as personal as direct mail, and won’t pay as 
much for each ad. Meanwhile dot.com advertisers have cut their spending on Yahoo 
sharply because of the on-going shakeout and need to conserve cash. eBay is seeing the 
early signs of market saturation, as fewer new users sign up and the novelty wears off for 
existing users.  Yet, their profits are growing, fueled by a 20 percent operating margin, 
and opportunities to expand into other markets. There are always technological changes 
and competitive attacks to cope with; indeed Yahoo is one of eBay’s biggest threats, but 
experience shows that both firms will survive if they continue to behave adaptively. 
Advantaged Incumbents 
 Prospective winners like Schwab, REI, Land’s End, Staples, and Primavera have 
achieved a synthesis of their traditional scale, scope, and resource advantages with the re-
forming potential of the Internet.  All the reasons why these incumbents are prevailing 
over the dot-com upstarts that once challenged their businesses can be seen in the short 
and troubled history of e-retailing. 
 The boom in e-retailing start-ups was fed by the belief that their lower costs—no 
buildings! no sales clerks! one central inventory!—and personalized service, could not be 
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matched by the incumbents.  In practice, costs on-line have been steeper and harder to 
cover than expected, and supposedly fixed costs such as warehousing kept growing so 
scale advantages have been hard to realize. A glut of look-alike entrants meant category 
revenues were divided too many ways, and price competition eroded prices to 
unsustainable levels.  
 Meanwhile, after a hesitant start, the incumbents were making their moves.  By 
early 1999, hybrids like Recreational Equipment Inc. were demonstrating that several 
channels could co-exist.14  This outdoor equipment retailer has fully integrated their 
catalog, on-line and physical retailing capabilities, along with in-store web kiosks that 
serve as information tools and can take orders.  The value proposition for rei.com is to 
deliver any product (a much larger assortment than any store could possibly carry), at any 
time, to any place, and to answer any question.  This web site helped them to overcome 
the inherent inability of their salespeople to master the gamut of products from hiking 
boots to kayaks and freeze-dried meals.  Their earlier experience with catalogs helped 
them manage the inevitable conflicts between the three types of channels.  
 REI and The Gap have also exploited the advantages of being able to return goods 
purchased on-line to a physical store or physically demonstrate products shown on-line.  
Yet, these synergies are not the real reasons why the incumbents seem set to prevail in 
most retail categories.  They have respected and visible brand names, an ability to spread 
advertising and marketing costs across both channels, and leverage with suppliers that 
add to an insurmountable advantage.  Because their gross margins are higher, their break-
even sales levels may be half of the pure play aspirants.    
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Adaptive Survivors 
While the odds favor the leading incumbents in markets being re-formed by the 
Internet and the first-movers in breakthrough markets, their eventual success is far from 
certain.  They will have to cope with high rates of company growth and absorb great 
uncertainty along many dimensions.  In common with all bust periods the e-commerce 
market will keep growing, and there are big gains in market share to capture from the 
losers.  Our studies of shakeouts in dozens of “old economy” markets reveal the 
predictable pitfalls that will have to be overcome. 
Avoid Complacency.  Andy Grove15 had it right, “Only the paranoid survive.”  In 
earlier shakeouts the biggest threat to the disruptive innovation that created a new market 
was yet another innovation.  Now the beneficiaries of the Internet disruption face a series 
of disruptive technologies that will keep firms off balance and create gateways for new 
entrants or rivals to exploit.  Ubiquitous wireless means customers can literally be 
anywhere.  With new information appliances, such as, pagers and PDAs, there are many 
more ways for these customers to interact over the net. 
 Incumbents will be understandably tempted to treat the demise of their dot.com 
challengers as an excuse to relax.  This would be foolish for they then become vulnerable 
to traditional rivals who will attack with all the productivity, speed, and personalization 
advantages enabled by digital business designs.  General Electric’s competitors should be 
worried that Jack Welch has gone from viewing the Internet as a “destroy your business” 
challenge, to a “grow your business” opportunity, to the latest theme of “destroy their 
business.” 
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 Exercise Management Discipline .  Fast growing businesses are often undone 
when they become much bigger without an aptitude for handling their new size.  
Managers, who were at home with the informality and cohesion of the early days, 
struggle with a stream of new faces that don’t know each other, or share the original 
values.  The informal style of decision-making becomes unwieldy, with increasing 
breakdowns in communication.  A new working style with experienced managers from 
the outside is needed, even if it means passing over loyal managers who were with the 
business from the beginning but lack the necessary skills.  When Dell Computers lost $36 
million in 1993 after several ill advised and poorly executed growth initiatives, Michael 
Dell began recruiting a cadre of seasoned managers.  Almost the entire top-management 
team was new, and their systematic, “by the numbers” approach, complemented the chief 
executives restless, innovative style. 
By early 2001, Yahoo was facing many of the same challenges that Dell had 
overcome earlier. Their leadership style was unraveling in the face of a sharp drop in 
revenue and an even steeper drop in market capitalization.16 A top-down approach, with a 
tight-knit coterie of six insiders involved in most deals and decisions, had worked well 
during the boom period. Rapid growth also led to a hiring binge that added more layers of 
new young employees and weakened the clubby culture; As pressure built to find new 
revenue sources and expand geographically, the management team found it difficult to 
delegate authority in the face of the downturn, which accelerated the exodus of 
executives. 
 A sound control system is also crucial to the maintenance of discipline during the 
turbulence of a shakeout.  This is when service problems emerge unexpectedly, logjams 
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in processes are likely, and there is a lack of timely information.  The controls that were 
designed for a smaller, simpler operation are unable to shed light on such problems as 
ballooning costs, excessive inventories or failures to meet commitments to customers. 
 Become Market-Driven.  In the cut-and-thrust of a shakeout, where the market is 
contested by fewer but larger competitors and customers seek to capture most of the 
value being created, businesses keep their footing by being market-driven.17  Two aspects 
of this orientation are especially pertinent to success in e-commerce markets.  Like all 
markets based on disruptive innovations the initial temptation is to exploit all the 
technological possibilities.  Many B2B exchanges were launched because they were 
possible, not because there was a compelling customer problem they could solve.  Thus, 
the first step is to shift the orientation to continuously learning about customers.  It was 
once estimated that fewer than 15 percent of all web start-ups tested their sites with 
customers by living with them and observing their behavior.  Winners will not make that 
mistake.  Instead, they will experiment continually, learn from customer feedback and 
use external metrics to monitor performance. 
 The second shift is from the indiscriminate acquisition of customers to spread the 
fixed costs of site development and start-up over as many customers as possible, to the 
retention of the most valuable customers.18  This re-orientation recognizes that it is not 
possible to be all things to all people, by accommodating all possible service 
requirements, and all level of technical expertise, and that profits depend on keeping 
customers for at least two or three years. 
 These two shifts in mind-set, values, and overall orientation require strong and 
sustained leadership.  According to John Chambers, the CEO of Cisco Systems, the first 
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lesson on managing high growth is to “make your customer the center of your culture.”  
Similarly, Jeff Bezos is piloting Amazon.com on a path to becoming a pure-play survivor 
with his vision that “we are the most customer-centric company…no other company on 
the Internet thinks about, talks about, and asks their customers as much as we do and tries 
to give them the best possible experience.” 
 Maintain Resource Slack.  An adaptive strategy won’t succeed if financial 
restrictions hobble critical development programs, or the right people aren’t in place 
when needed, or there is no way to get to the target market.  It is also unhealthy to be so 
close to the edge that there is no slack available to pursue new opportunities.  Successful 
e-commerce strategies have a well-defined thrust that defines how they deliver superior 
value to their customers, but enough flexibility to pursue unexpected variants and 
extension as they emerge. 
New Imperatives in Digital Markets 
 Survival in a digital market shakeout takes all the resiliency of past adaptive 
survivors and more.  We find that prospective survivors in e-commerce markets have two 
further attributes that have not been so evident in the past. 
 First, the survivors will be those with the most real options.  These options create 
opportunities, but not obligations to make further commitments; in this way the business 
preserves the flexibility to change course as more is learned.  Amazon, for example, has 
many real options because it can be and has been able to move relatively cheaply into a 
number of new businesses.  These are all enabled by the close relations that millions of 
customers have with the most reliable and trustworthy Web site in the business.  
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Conversely, the dot-coms that are failing have few real options for growth because they 
lack strong relationships with a clearly defined group of customers.   
 The second imperative is the need to master an unprecedented array of 
technologies and specialized firm capabilities.  In response a swarm of specialized firms 
has sprung up to provide call centers for service inquiries, hosting sites for servers, 
facilities to fill and deliver small orders, measurements of performance and provide 
virtually every other business activity.  The ability to manage the ensuing web of 
alliances and partnerships is one of the most distinctive differences between the winners 
and losers.  
Among the winners there is a strong “share to gain” mentality that is adept at 
forming and nurturing partnerships that serve the interests of both parties. Co-marketing 
agreements are one particularly intriguing type of linkage. For an established firm, these 
agreements maintain low-risk links to new technologies or markets, provide access to the 
benefits of the technological capabilities held within the new venture, and help to fully 
utilize marketing resources. For a new venture, these agreements offer access to the 
benefits of the marketing capabilities held within an established firm and cost-effective 
entry to multiple markets.  These marketing alliances should involve valuable ancillary 
components as well, such as cash payments, equity ownership, or the transfer of 
technology know-how.   
Strategies for Also-Rans 
 During the bust, most companies get squeezed out or have their aspirations 
sharply curtailed.  These also-rans fit a familiar profile. Their scale is usually small 
relative to the leaders, and that means higher costs, lower visibility and much less control 
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over their strategy.  They lack the resources to pursue attractive options or keep up with 
the pace of innovation and morale slumps.  They are thus all the more vulnerable when 
people, partners, or financial capital become scarce. 
 Although most pure-plays in re-formed markets are destined to be also-rans they 
often have better options than simply selling out to an incumbent or shutting down.  But 
often these options are not contemplated until it is too late, because it is enormously 
difficult for people caught up in the start-up enthusiasm to accept the implications of 
also-ran status.  But when the loser profile fits, it is better to choose a viable strategy than 
to let market forces drive your fate. 
 The best chance for survival is to find a market niche where competitive pressures 
are muted and growth prospects are satisfactory.  Retreating to these positions does 
require a painful shrinking of aspirations and pruning of operations.  It takes considerable 
discipline for a high-flying dot-com to abandon their excursions into adjacent markets. 
This remedy applies to firms like Priceline whose once touted name-your-own-
price model is now seen to be a variation on well-established pricing formulas.  Their 
approach works well with airline tickets because accurate, timely information about the 
best prices is hard to get, and the seats must be sold before the fight.  But customers must 
be willing to put up with the inconvenience of not being able to choose their airline or 
time of day they will fly.  Within this narrow niche Priceline has a loyal and potentially 
profitable customer base.  These conditions do not apply to the long-distance telephone, 
automobile, or mortgage markets where prices are more transparent.  Priceline would 
enhance their survival prospects by exiting these businesses and taking the firm private to 
nurture their core business. 
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 In the absence of a clear buffer strategy, dot-coms with shaky long-run prospects 
can still come out ahead if they have the courage to face the future honestly.  Those with 
the best foresight will be able to garner the best sales opportunity, leaving the laggards 
little choice but to close the doors.  
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